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Too Dependent on Contractors?
Minimum Standards for
Responsible Governance
In the outsourcing debate, there are many benefits, challenges, and risks involved in privatization, but it is failed
implementation, rather than outsourcing policy, that explains the government’s (mis)management of its contractors.
This article addresses the issue of outsourcing and explores the minimum standards for responsible governance.
B Y S T E V E N L . S C H O O N E R A N D D A N I E L S . G R E E N S PA H N

Irresponsible Delegation and the
Downward Spiral

Early in the twenty-first century, a longstanding, subtle trend
toward outsourcing accelerated into a fundamental change in
the nature of federal government. Federal procurement
spending nearly doubled within six years,1 and with no
reason to expect the hollow-government2 trend to reverse, the
future seems bright for contractors. The public is slowly
gaining awareness of this reality, albeit primarily through
anecdotal and typically scandal-based information, but few
appreciate that today the government likely employs more
contractors than soldiers in Iraq;3 that high-profile mishaps
are directly attributed to an unprecedented, poorly orchestrated reliance on private security;4 and that during 2006,
more than one in four allied fatalities consisted of contractor
or civilian personnel.5
Closer to home, five years after the largest government
reorganization in half a century, the heavily outsourced
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) remains the target
of criticism due to its disproportionate reliance upon the
private sector. DHS’s experience confirms the obvious
proposition that outsourcing as a matter of necessity, rather
than as a matter of policy, leads to suboptimal results, and it
appears no relief is in sight. Tasked to protect against terrorist
attacks and respond to natural disasters, the cobbled-together
and heavily outsourced DHS instead often finds itself

defending, well, itself, particularly against allegations of
inadequate management and oversight of its contractors.6
And while confronting these procurement challenges is
important and indeed necessary, Congress routinely fails to
recognize that throwing stones, while easier, is far less
effective than developing solutions for solving difficult
problems or building solid foundations.
Recommendations for meaningful, long-term procurement
reform—whether for DHS or across the federal government—must recognize the practical ramifications of
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sustained, unplanned, and unchecked privatization in an era
of downsized government. Despite a generation of bipartisan
efforts to portray a “small government” to the public,7
government mandates continue to increase, leaving agencies
no choice but to increasingly rely upon contractors to provide
mission-critical services. Simultaneously, however, Congress
embarked upon an ill-conceived gutting of the acquisition
workforce. This effort not only left the government woefully
understaffed to manage its omnipresent cadre of service
contractors, but also—through an absence of succession
planning manifested by more than a decade of cuts and
hiring freezes—ensured that fixing the damage could not
feasibly be achieved in the foreseeable future.

Too Dependent on Contractors?

Focusing on DHS as a proxy for the larger trend, it oversimplifies the outsourcing management problem to suggest that
the agency is currently too dependent upon contractors. As a
matter of policy, it is possible that, under different circumstances, an outsourced and privatized DHS may better serve
the government’s interests.8 This potentially fascinating
debate—over how much we should outsource—quickly
polarizes participants into two basic camps. One camp
staunchly advocates the rapidly changing status quo: that
work historically or currently being performed by government
employees should remain in-house.9 This position idolizes, or
at the very least respects, both the ethos of public service and,
more generally, public servants.10 The opposite camp advocates outsourcing or reliance upon the private sector, asserting
that for-profit firms are capable of performing much of the
government’s work and, if properly motivated and managed,
should outperform government employees in terms of quality
of service, price of service, or both.11
However, at an abstract level, neither position is uniquely
compelling.12 Empirical evidence is scant to demonstrate that
government employees are more talented, committed,
motivated, or honest than their private-sector counterparts
(and vice-versa). But the two groups differ dramatically in
their incentive structures. The private sector’s exposure to
market forces, and the related corporate purpose of pursuing
profit, permits (and arguably requires) a more diverse and
potent arsenal of employee incentives and disincentives. These
tools include compensation (e.g., attractive salaries, salary
increases, bonuses, stock incentives, etc.), opportunity for
advancement, and of course, the risk of termination.13 While
the government can employ similar tools, their effect—or the
degree to which these tools can influence behavior—is at least
perceived as far less dramatic, given a heavily constrained
promotion and bonus regime and an impenetrable de facto
10

tenure system.14 Ultimately, the private sector enjoys the
flexibility to offer far greater economic rewards for success
and threaten more credible sanctions for less than desirable
performance.15 While we continue to witness efforts to reform
the civil service system and inject more potent performance
incentives, doing so remains a daunting task.16

No Relief in Sight?

Ultimately, however, this debate is increasingly academic.
Outsourcing is currently the inevitable reality.17 Today, the
government relies on the private sector because it has
restricted the size of government—more specifically, the
number of government employees.18
Overseas, the government currently has no short-term
option but to rely on contractors for every conceivable task
that it lacks appropriate staff to fulfill. In Iraq, the military
relies on contractor personnel not only for transportation,
shelter, and food, but for unprecedented levels of battlefield
and weaponry operation, support, and maintenance.19
Accordingly, defense experts now recognize that without
contractors, our military simply cannot project its technical
superiority abroad.20 But highly publicized incidents—whether of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib or allegations of the
shooting of civilians by the private military company
Blackwater—raise fundamental questions regarding both the
tasking of contractor personnel and the oversight of their
performance.21
At home, DHS also has no meaningful short-term
alternatives for escaping its current predicament. It would
take many years to build DHS into a significantly larger,
cohesive organization,22 and it is unlikely that there is enough
political will on either side of the aisle to grow the federal
workforce.23 Further, it is distinctly possible, given the
constraints of the federal service (particularly in terms of
compensation), that even if Congress mandated a dramatic
expansion, DHS simply could not assemble a sufficiently
talented organization.24 For example, the market for talent is
now global, and the global shortage of engineers is well
documented.25 Thus, it is not an option for DHS to consolidate its missions, jettison a number of its tasks, terminate
contracts, or to take on only those missions it is appropriately
staffed to perform.26 Nor is it feasible for DHS to wait while it
embarks upon an aggressive program to identify, recruit, hire,
and retain an extraordinary number of civil servants. Accordingly, DHS must continue to employ its best efforts to
achieve its mission with the resources available, acknowledge
that it is a rather “hollow” agency,27 and invest significant
energy and resources in improving its use of contractors to
help it achieve its mission.28
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Figure 1.

An Ounce of Prevention…

Accordingly, today the government needs to invest significant
resources—time, money, and energy—to recruit, train,
incentivize, and retain a dramatically expanded acquisition
workforce.29 Not only must the government promptly and
aggressively recruit a huge number of business-minded
professionals, but also must train the new personnel and
provide supplemental training to the existing workforce to
enhance their competence and expertise. Further, the government needs to provide meaningful incentives for, and employ
creative solutions to retain (or of course, to continually recruit
and train) over time, the best, most experienced professionals.
Unfortunately, few satisfactory short-term solutions exist to
solve the current acquisition workforce crisis.30 A personnel
crisis methodically orchestrated over more than a 15-year
period cannot be ameliorated overnight. Even if for the
foreseeable future the government hired every qualified
acquisition professional willing to work for the government, it
would still likely prove insufficient to meet the government’s
needs. (And that is without taking into account the wellchronicled upcoming exodus of retirement-eligible acquisition
personnel.)31 Moreover, there is every reason to be pessimistic
about the government’s ability to promptly and effectively
train such an influx of professionals. Similarly, current
demographic information suggests that younger, entry-level
workers are far more mobile than their predecessors, which
may make retention of this new talent difficult.

However, the specifics—such as how many thousands more
acquisition professionals (5,000; 10,000; or more) must be
hired,32 how the procurement community should receive meaningful hands-on training, and how these professionals should
be incentivized—are far less important than the threshold issue
or predicate. Congress must invest heavily and aggressively in
rebuilding the acquisition workforce. Significant improvement
depends upon a clear message from Congress accompanied by
sustained, dramatic increases in appropriations specifically for
acquisition personnel.33 Flexible recruitment and hiring
authority, as well as increased flexibility with regard to
compensation and incentives, may prove necessary. Absent
such a commitment, which would be as welcome as it would be
unexpected, any attempted solution will serve as little more
than a finger in the dike.

The Expanding Scope of Outsourcing:
Contract Proliferation and Increased
Reliance on Service Contractors

Government use of, and reliance upon, private contractors is
not a new phenomenon,34 nor are debates over the relative
benefits and risks of outsourcing government work. In the
1960s, President Eisenhower warned against the unwarranted influence of military contractors,35 and a report to
President Kennedy expressed similar concerns about the
blurring lines between public and private decision-making.36
Journal of Contract Management / Summer 2008
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Yet, in recent years, Democratic and Republican administrations and congressional leaders alike have all embraced a
downsized federal government supported by private
contractors.37 This has led to unprecedented privatization in
both breadth and scope.
Today, for the first time in modern U.S. history, the federal
government spends nearly 50 cents of every discretionary
dollar of the federal budget on contracts with private firms.38
Procurement spending has nearly doubled from $219 billion
in 2000 to more than $415 billion in 2006,39 and continues
to rise, while the rest of the discretionary budget has increased only 6.7 percent per year.40 At the Department of
Defense (DOD), federal contract spending more than
doubled from $133 billion in 2000 to over $297 billion in
2006, accounting for 72 percent of the federal procurement
budget.41 Also, DHS spending on contracts soared 337
percent in four years and rose from $5 billion in 2003 to $15
billion in 2006.42
The rapid post-millennium growth in federal government
contracting43 —the lion’s share of which is services contracting—has dramatically outpaced (indeed, each year, more
than doubled) the rate of inflation. As Figure 1 demonstrates,
the rate of growth in federal procurement spending has
exceeded the increases in the consumer price index (CPI)
every year this decade. But even that understates the enormity
of the growth. Overall, as indicated in Figure 2, from 2000
through the end of 2006, the CPI rose only 17.1 percent,
12
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while federal procurement spending rose by 89.2 percent. In
other words, in this decade, federal procurement spending
increased at a rate five times the rate of inflation. During that
time frame, the federal workforce remained largely stable, but
significantly smaller than in earlier years.44
In addition to hiring more contractor personnel, the
government today relies upon contractors for increasingly
critical and sensitive defense-related tasks, and turns more
and more to contractors for healthcare, education, welfare,
and prison management.45 In the wakes of the September 11,
2001 tragedy and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the government contracted out public service obligations such as disaster
relief, border security, port security, and policing,46 but no
outsourcing undertaking has proven more controversial than
the use of contractors in military and foreign operations.47
In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors provide support
services such as food, housing, and sanitation for U.S. troops,
but also gather intelligence, maintain weapons, train troops,
and handle interrogations.48 The private military industry has
mushroomed49 with a disconcerting number of private
contractors on the ground in Iraq, many of whom bear
arms.50 In describing the modern era “soldiers for hire”
phenomenon, Peter Singer, author of Corporate Warriors: The
Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, explained that “the
wholesale outsourcing of U.S. military services since the
1990s is unprecedented.”51
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Why Outsourcing Makes Sense

While these facts and statistics may suggest otherwise, none
of this should be read as a conceptual or ideological opposition to outsourcing. Outsourcing permits organizations to
focus on what they do best (which hopefully coincides with
the organizations’ missions or mandates), while relying upon
other more efficient entities to provide the goods, services,
and support necessary to do so. Moreover, the government
has historically sought experience, innovation, and capacity
from the private sector. That makes sense. Experience
suggests that privatization offers many potential benefits,
including surge capacity, flexibility, innovation, and quite
often, the ability to meet agency missions using limited
government personnel, abilities, and resources. Despite a
relentless deluge of negative publicity and, unfortunately, a
number of contractor missteps, many of these benefits—
particularly in terms of speed, quality of service, and customer satisfaction—have been demonstrated by the U.S. Army’s
global use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP).52 Another instructive, but oft-criticized, anecdote can be found in the government’s increased use of
large-scale “seat management” contracts to outsource agencies’
information technology functions to the private sector.53
Using outside contractors for surge capacity offers the
government the ability to supplement limited governmental
resources far more quickly, efficiently, and effectively than the
existing federal personnel or acquisition regimes permit.54 The
federal government can tap contractor personnel when war,
storms, or earthquakes occur, without keeping excess (and
thus idle) personnel on the payroll during times of calm or,
much later, funding their retirement and subsidizing their
healthcare.55 Contractors also enjoy more flexibility in setting
compensation and benefits and in hiring and firing, making
them better situated than the government to react to fluctuating markets to meet short-term demands for workers.56
Whether in Baghdad or New Orleans, private contractors
have the potential to offer superior speed and geographic
flexibility in terms of deploying expertise.57
Privatization also offers flexibility in employing superior
technology, better talent, and different approaches than the
government’s existing workforce and capital resources would
permit.58 In an era of downsized government,59 private
contractors provide specifically what the government lacks,
such as the skill, expertise, and innovation necessary to carry
out government functions.60 Thus, contractors are a critical
resource for agencies struggling to fulfill their missions,
particularly where the federal government has limited staffing,
resources, or skills. For agencies operating under tight
personnel ceilings that restrict staffing, contractors have
significantly helped to execute government functions.61 By

taking over ancillary responsibilities, contractors also enable
agency staff to focus on core responsibilities,62 which in the
defense context, is typically described as increasing the
military services’ “tooth to tail” ratio.63
Although cost savings are sometimes deemed a benefit of
privatization, some critics question whether contractors are
more cost-effective.64 In any event, the potential for cost
savings alone should not be deemed a primary benefit for
reliance upon contractors, and slavish focus upon the relative
cost of contractor support is misguided. Moreover, it is not
productive to criticize agencies for paying contractors “too
much” without:
•
•
•
•

Permitting, as an alternative, an agency to hire
additional personnel;
Confirming that sufficient personnel are available
in the marketplace and willing to work for the
government;
Comparing “apples to apples,” such as taking into
account all of the long-term or legacy costs of civil
servants or members of the armed services; and
Considering critical issues such as flexibility and
surge capacity.65

For example, higher contractor salaries may be offset, at
least in part, by long-run costs avoided. Indeed, a strong case
could be made that for short-term demands for additional
resources it makes sense to pay higher, and potentially
significantly higher, amounts for contractor support rather
than incurring the legacy cost of additional government
employees.

Challenges of Outsourced Government

There are, of course, competing challenges associated with
any organization relying extensively on contractors or other
external resources. In addition to maintaining a cohesive
culture and instilling shared values, the central difficulties
lie in planning, negotiating, managing, and overseeing
effective contracts and most importantly, maintaining a
sufficiently educated, experienced, and motivated government (or augmented) workforce to take on these challenges.
Adequate government planning is necessary to both
understand and describe the outcomes and tasks that will be
sought from the private sector. As today’s procurement
officials are often overworked and undersupported, planning
is extremely limited or simply delegated to contractors.66
Accordingly, critics lament that statements of work routinely
lack measurable outcomes, and that contractors prepare
budgets, manage employee relations in a blended workforce,
Journal of Contract Management / Summer 2008

13

too dependen t on con t r ac tors? minimum standards for responsible governance

and develop regulations.67 Privatization also requires selecting
appropriate, qualified contractors in a timely fashion, negotiating cost-effective agreements, and drafting clear contracts
that contain effective incentives or profit mechanisms to
maximize contractor performance. The inability to satisfactorily perform any of these functions alters the nature of the
government’s delegation. For example, like other agencies,
DHS risks becoming “so dependent on contractors that it
simply has no in-house ability to evaluate the solutions its
contractors propose or to develop options on its own accord.”68 Lastly, privatization requires that the government
manage its contractual relationships and provide appropriate
oversight to ensure it receives value for its money and avoids
corruption. At best, poorly managed outsourcing reduces the
likelihood that the government will get value for the taxpayers’ money; at worst, it renders the public’s expenditures
susceptible to inefficiency and waste.69
DHS continues to experience the challenges of privatization and is persistently criticized for its ineffective
contract management and oversight.70 The DHS inspector
general (IG), for example, has identified plentiful examples
of poorly defined contractual requirements, inadequate
oversight, unsatisfactory results, and unnecessary costs.71
In part, the problem stems from DHS never having
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the proper
balance between its employees and contractors.72 Instead,
DHS, like other federal agencies, simply hired contractors
to supervise other contractors. For example, DHS estimates that 60 percent of the 270 personnel it will use to
oversee the massive SBInet border security contract will be
contractors.73 Also, DHS has vested a great deal of
decision-making authority in its contractors, such as in the
U.S. Coast Guard’s “Deepwater” initiative, in ways that
critics perceive as impeding agency authority over the
design and production of its own assets.74
Of course, DHS is not alone in drawing criticism for
ineffective oversight,75 lacking the resources and authority to ensure adequate contract oversight,76 or relying on
outside help to prepare budgets, develop policy, and
coordinate intelligence (which puts the agency at risk of
being unduly influenced by contractors).77 Even a former
DHS chief procurement officer (CPO) recognized the
fact that the blurred lines between government and
contractor employees in a blended workforce raises
concerns about organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs)
and contractor ethics.78 In short, according to the CPO,
there are “too many contractors performing too many
functions with too little supervision.” 79
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Risks of Poorly Orchestrated
Outsourcing

Against this backdrop, the risks of relying so heavily upon
contractors are constrained only by one’s imagination. These
risks include, but are by no means limited to:
•
•
•
•

Interference with an agency’s ability to
accomplish its mission;
Harm being inflicted upon the public, the
government, and others;
Loss of public confidence in the government;
and, of course,
Excessive expenditure of public funds.80

To exacerbate these risks, in an uncertain legal regime,
there is a heightened risk that contractors cannot be held
accountable and thus will escape liability for corruption
or criminal acts. 81
There is no shortage of examples to demonstrate the
risks of privatization. Isolated examples, such as scandals
at Abu Ghraib or improper accounting and billing
practices by KBR/Halliburton, gave way to a host of
evolving foibles in Iraq.82 At home, in March 2008,
privacy abuses involving all three of the major 2008
presidential candidates83 and in antiterrorist data mining
illustrates the problems of employing private contractors in
response to the 9/11 attacks.84 The poorly orchestrated and
seemingly uncoordinated response to Hurricane Katrina
and plans to give contractors virtual autonomy in handling
captured illegal immigrants at the United States/Mexico
border demonstrate that significant outsourcing risks will
continue to haunt DHS for some time.85
Although there is always room for minimizing these
risks, the current laws and regulations governing today’s
acquisition environment are, for the most part, adequate.86 Rather, the lion’s share of DHS’ and the
government’s contracting difficulties can be traced to the
implementation of those laws, regulations, and policies.
And implementation is more about people than policy.
The root cause of the problems is derived from resource
deficiencies and more specifically, an inadequate acquisition workforce.

Inadequate Investment in Acquisition
Resources is Irresponsible Given the
Government’s Unavoidable Reliance
upon Contractors

Unfortunately, acknowledgment of the acquisition workforce
crisis has been slow in coming and at times impeded by
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denial.87 Today, as the topic gains traction, it is easy to agree
with Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations for reform at DHS.88 It is difficult to conceive of a
higher priority for a heavily outsourced agency, such as DHS,
than to “assess program office staff and expertise necessary to
provide sufficient oversight” of its most important service
contracts.89 GAO is correct to prod DHS to assess the risks of
relying so heavily upon contractors as part of the acquisition
process. While DHS may have no choice but to rely upon
contractors despite those risks, the discipline may result in
contracts that more carefully attempt to control those risks.
Further, DHS should “define contract requirements to clearly
describe roles, responsibilities, and limitations” as part of the
acquisition planning process.90 Additional effort devoted to
acquisition planning will pay dividends during contract
performance.91

The Need for Acquisition Workforce
Investments

Again, DHS is not alone. The federal government must
devote more resources to the acquisition function. This investment is urgent following the bipartisan congressionally
mandated acquisition workforce reductions that spanned the
1990s.92 Although no empirical evidence supported the policy,
the sustained reductions and subsequent failure to replenish

the workforce created a generational void and devastated
procurement personnel morale.93 By some measures, as Figure
3 illustrates, DOD’s acquisition workforce of over 500,000 in
1990 was slashed to 300,000 in 1996 and to 200,000 in 2004,
at the very same time that its procurement budget doubled
from $145 billion in 1990 to over $380 billion in 2006.94
Simultaneously, the government skimped on training, as
contracting officers faced increasing workloads and confronted dramatically changing and increasingly complex contractual challenges.95 Despite the explosive growth in the reliance
upon service contracts,96 no emphasis was placed upon
obtaining or retaining skilled professionals to plan for,
compete, award, or manage sophisticated long-term service
contracts.97 As a result, “the shift from the acquisition of
goods to...services, combined with the heavy reliance on
interagency contracting, has resulted in ‘markedly greater
demands on the Acquisition Workforce for capability,
training, time, and sophistication.’”98
The macro (governmentwide) and micro (acquisition
workforce) effects of the 1990s downsizing frenzy left the
federal government woefully unprepared to identify, recruit,
manage, and incentivize the (hypothetically revolutionized)
acquisition workforce envisioned by the 1990s reforms.99 The
dramatic increase in procurement spending since the 9/11
attacks exacerbated the simmering workforce crisis.100
Congressional investment in the people who are responsible
Journal of Contract Management / Summer 2008
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for that procurement has not kept pace, even as Congress
nuance is critical to understanding the significance of the
began to recognize that agencies “currently lack the means to
outsourcing trends and the scope of the delegation of
provide proper oversight of...service contracts, in part because government duties and responsibilities implicated by that
of an insufficient number of contract oversight personnel.”101
outsourcing. Use of personal service contracts—
Quite simply, today the government lacks sufficient qualified “characterized by the employer–employee relationship [they]
acquisition, contract management, and quality control
create between the government and the contractor’s
personnel to handle the growth in service contracts,102 and
personnel”—empowers contractor personnel to make
the existing personnel lack the qualifications and experience
discretionary decisions historically (and, arguably, legally)
necessary for them to perform a complicated, highly discrerequired to be made by government officials.110
103
tionary task over extended periods of time.
In a classic (nonpersonal) services contract, the government
Unfortunately, as our procurement system has struggled
delegates a function to a contractor. Conversely, in personal
throughout this decade, more energy has been devoted to
services contracts, the government retains the function, but
punishment rather than cure. Specifically, Congress has been
contractor personnel staff the effort. Despite longstanding
quick to call for more auditors and IGs to scrutinize contractlegal and policy objections to the use of personal services
ing and increase accountability.104 While this is a responsible
contracts,111 we have witnessed an explosive growth in what
gesture, the corresponding call for more contracting experts
are referred to as “body shop” or “employee augmentation” arand staff to perform the many functions that are necessary for rangements, through which the government, as a matter of
the procurement system to work well has been both delayed
practice and necessity, hires contractor personnel to replace,
and, sadly, muted.105 In order to serve the taxpaying public
supplement, or work alongside civil servants or members of
and to meet the needs of agency customers, acquisition
the armed forces.112 This is the antithesis of the government’s
professionals must:
preferred approach, known as “performance-based service
contracting.”113 Civil servants work alongside, with, and at
• Promptly and accurately describe what the
times, for contractor employees who sit in seats previously
government needs to buy,
occupied by government employees.114 Unfortunately, no one
• Assess the marketplace to identify and select quality stopped to train the government workforce on how to operate
suppliers,
in such an environment, referred to as a “blended work• Strike deals that ensure fair prices,
force.”115 The worst-case scenarios have arisen where contrac• Structure contracts with proper monetary incentors perform work under open-ended contracts without
tives for good performance, and
guidance or management from a responsible government
• Effectively manage and evaluate contractor
official, and typically facilitated by the reliance on interagency
performance.106
contracting vehicles. Increasing attention to this oversight
vacuum has begun to reign in this practice,116 but the practice,
Accordingly, the contracting workforce—understaffed,
with its attendant delegation of authority from government
under-resourced, and underappreciated—desperately requires
officials to contractor personnel, persists.
a dramatic recapitalization.107 But acquiring the necessary
Across the government, the longstanding prohibitions
talent to do so will not be easy. Senior government officials
against personal services contracting have become dead letter.117
increasingly bemoan that no young person in his or her right
With the prohibition’s erosion, the scope of the government’s
mind would enter government contracting as a career.108 And
delegation to its contractors expands. In less than a decade,
it is possible that even an extremely aggressive recruiting
services contracts grew 72 percent at DOD from $82 billion in
campaign may do no more than keep pace with the pending
1996 to $141 billion in 2005.118 DHS already enjoys greater
exodus of retirement-eligible acquisition professionals that
authority to employ personal services contracting authority
constitute the current workforce’s critical mass.109
through the Homeland Security Act.119 In addition to potential
OCIs,120 this trend raises a number of issues regarding the management of human capital.121 In attempting to attract and
Personal Services Contracting as a
retain a qualified workforce, DHS may find it increasingly
Symptom of the Acquisition Crisis
difficult to articulate why individuals should come to work for
Turning from the macro to the micro, one of the most
or stay employed by DHS rather than its contractors.122 This
intriguing aspects of necessity-driven outsourcing has been
problem is particularly acute where contractors employ
the erosion of the government’s longstanding prohibitions
incentives such as compensation, training, and travel to reward
against personal services contracting. This little-understood
and retain their top talent.
16
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Conclusion: A Call to Action

In the end, the federal government’s inadequate and often
failed implementation of its outsourcing efforts renders it
difficult, if not impossible, to draw broad conclusions on the
validity of outsourcing as a matter of public policy. The
primary lessons learned from the past 20 years merely reflect
the fundamental assumptions commonly accepted by
competent procurement professionals. First, if a procuring
entity fails to invest time and energy in understanding its
requirements and, equally important, articulating its desired
outcomes (or frankly, what value it expects to receive in
return for its money) to its private-sector business partner, it is
unlikely that the government’s end user will be satisfied with
the result. More specifically, failure to plan typically guarantees a suboptimal result. Finally, outsourcing—particularly of
mission-critical, complex tasks—requires a large, experienced,
and properly incentivized cadre of skilled professionals to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Plan;
Identify requirements;
Conduct market research;
Draft specifications and solicitations;
Manage competitions;
Draft, negotiate, and award contracts; and
Manage contractor performance by providing:
–– Advice and guidance,
–– Quality assurance,
–– Compliance through appropriate oversight,
–– Facilitation of invoicing and payment,
–– The proper handling of contingencies (and
related modifications and terminations),
–– The closing out of contractual relationships,
and
–– Generally ensuring appropriate stewardship
of the public’s scarce resources.

Unfortunately, more than 15 years of ill-conceived and
inadequate investment in the federal government’s acquisition
workforce, followed by a governmentwide failure to respond to
a dramatic increase in procurement activity, has led to a buying
and contract management regime animated by triage, with
insufficient resources available for contract administration,
management, and oversight.123 The old adage “an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure” rings true. More auditors
and IGs, in performing their critical functions, will guarantee a
steady stream of scandals. But they will neither help avoid the
scandals nor improve the procurement system. Conversely, a
prospective investment in upgrading the number, skills,
incentives, and morale of government purchasing officials
would reap huge long-term dividends for the taxpayers.

Despite all of the credit it deserves for adding the acquisition workforce to its mandate, in the end, the Acquisition
Advisory Panel (AAP) failed to demand sufficiently forceful
action on this critical issue. The AAP concluded that it lacked
sufficient, credible information on the size, composition, or
strength of the current acquisition workforce to make
meaningful recommendations as to the target size of the
acquisition workforce. Fortunately, the Gansler Commission
did not similarly shy away from the core problem, instead
sounding a clarion call for restoration and reinvigoration of
the acquisition workforce: “The Commission believes that the
Army contracting community has reached a ‘tipping point’
that requires extraordinary action.”124 Moreover, the report
presciently articulates: “Too often it takes a crisis to bring
about major change—the Iraq/Kuwait/Afghanistan contracting problems have created a crisis!”125
While DHS’s experience may be unique due to its
lightning-rod, magnetic attraction of criticism, and the army’s
courage in its self-assessment is commendable, neither the
army nor DHS is alone in facing this crisis. Rather, this
problem—pervasive reliance upon contractors without
sufficient qualified personnel to properly manage contractual
relationships—bedevils the entire federal government.
At the same time, this problem requires strong leadership
and the upcoming presidential election poses another
daunting challenge. The public neither comprehends nor
favors outsourcing as a matter of policy. Moreover, the
acquisition community, the nuances of the procurement
regime, and the demands inherent in purchasing more than
$400 billion annually of services, supplies, and construction,
are invisible to the public. Similarly, the public has no grasp
on the direct relationship between outsourcing and the need
to invest heavily in the acquisition workforce. Accordingly,
none of the presidential candidates—Democrat, Republican,
or (when still in the race) Independent—believed their
campaigns would benefit from suggesting that good government (or for that matter, competent government) demands a
massive infusion of resources to restore and reinvigorate the
acquisition workforce,126 nor should we expect a leadership
epiphany after the 2008 election.
Although a small number of influential members of
Congress—Senators Susan Collins (R-ME) and Joseph
Lieberman (I-CT), and Representative Henry Waxman
(D-CA), to name a few—have begun to recognize the need,
they lack the power to generate the sufficient investment
required to recapitalize the acquisition workforce. But at least
the process has begun, however tentatively. Accordingly, the
acquisition community and those directly affected by it must
engage in an unprecedented effort to educate our elected
representatives not only of the need for resources, but also in
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the dividends to be reaped by investment in the acquisition
community. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP) must aggressively take up the leadership role assigned
by S. 680.127 At a minimum, OFPP must become the
acquisition workforce’s primary advocate and cheerleader; a
role from which it too often has shied away. Similarly, NCMA
is well positioned to lead such an initiative, but it cannot
succeed alone. Unlimited potential allies exist; they need only
be harnessed.
Together, the combined voices of those that favor good
government, fiscal responsibility, and good business can
articulate the government’s need for a well-staffed, experienced, and well-trained acquisition workforce. The case is
clear and the need is great. The time for action is now. JCM
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